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Abstract
Many works in the past showed that human judgments of uncertainty do not conform very well
to probability theory. The present paper reports four experiments that were conducted in order
to evaluate if human judgments of uncertainty conform better to possibility theory. At first, two
experiments investigate the descriptive properties of some basic possibilistic measures. Then a new
measurement apparatus is used, the Ψ -scale, to compare possibilistic vs. probabilistic disjunction
and conjunction. Results strongly suggest that a human judgment is qualitative in essence, closer to
a possibilistic than to a probabilistic approach of uncertainly. The paper also describes a qualitative
heuristic, for conjunction, which was used by expert radiologists.
 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
For a lot of practical reasons (e.g., improving man-machine interfaces, designing
decision support systems, and so on), it is of primary importance to be able to relate
descriptive models of human judgments to normative models, that is, to formal models
that state what are the ideal judgments. When a situation falls in the domain of validity of a
formal model, that is, if the axioms of a normative theory are verified in the situation, this
theory can be interpreted as a normative framework: an ideal rater would be supposed
to behave accordingly. When actual judgments do not conform to those norms, being
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able to compare how judgments are built with what they should be may help developing
prescriptions for improving performance, building efficient tutorials, and so on. The present
article investigates the descriptive power of a normative framework: possibility theory.
Uncertainty is at the heart of crucial decision-making processes such as medical diag-
nosis. Due to various reasons, the modeling of human processes for uncertainty handling
has traditionally been approached from a probabilistic standpoint: human performance was
compared to probabilistic prescriptions and any divergence was interpreted as a deviation
from the optimal behavior. In the same line, subjective estimates of confidence were often
called “subjective probabilities” by psychologists. For example, Eddy stated that physi-
cians “can have degrees of certainty about the patient’s condition. . . . We can associate
a probability, the physician’s subjective probability that the patient has cancer, with this
degree of certainty” [12, p. 251]. Probability, as a normative framework, however, might
not always be applicable to situations that humans face. Thus, there is no reason, in the
general case, to believe that human judgments of uncertainty must be probabilities. As
Shafer remarked, generally, the objective probabilities associated with possible events are
not known, and “if we know the chances, then we will surely adopt them as our degrees of
belief. But if we do not know the chances, then it will be an extraordinary coincidence for
our degrees of belief to be equal to them.” [23, p. 16]. The need for alternative approaches
has been advocated in the psychology literature (e.g., [15]), but few studies actually tackled
this question. The present paper reports experimental evidence supporting that possibility
theory (Zadeh [36]; Dubois and Prade [8]) might be a better framework for human uncer-
tainty than probability theory, and that “subjective probabilities”1 could advantageously be
renamed “subjective possibilities”.
To begin with, some data against the framework of probability theory are recalled. Then,
reasons are given why possibility theory might be a suitable candidate as a normative
framework for human uncertainty. Finally several experiments are reported, which test
directly if human processing of uncertainty conforms better to probability theory or to
possibility theory prescriptions.
1.1. Problems with the probabilistic approach to human uncertainty
When compared to the probabilistic norm, confidence judgments are subject to internal
and external consistency problems. Some examples are presented here but for a more
extensive review, see Wright and Ayton [34].
A large number of studies have found effects showing that subjective estimates do not
conform to the requirements of probability theory, including conjunction and disjunction
effects (Barclay and Beach [5]; Bar-Hillel [4]; Wyer [35]; Tversky and Kahneman [16,26,
27]). Overall those results strongly suggest that it is possible to induce strong violations
of rationality. In a typical example of the very robust conjunction effect, experimenters
obtained ratings in which the probability that a young woman, Linda, was feminist AND
bank teller was higher than the probability that Linda was bank teller alone. Such violations
1 The reader must keep in mind that, in this paper, “subjective probability” does not necessarily entails a
Bayesian standpoint, but simply a standpoint where human confidence judgments should have the properties of
probability measures.
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are compatible with no normative theory of uncertainty. Although a lot of studies were
devoted to this effect, the question of the rationality of this behavior is not closed. For
example, it is still possible that subjects in these experiments actually conformed to
conversational rules (e.g., Adler [1]; Dulany and Hilton [11]). In other studies, about
revision in a Bayesian approach, some experimenters obtained “conservatism” (Edwards
[13]), that is, a too important weight given to the prior probability (the base-rate). To
the contrary, other experimenters could produce base-rate neglect (e.g., Kahneman and
Tversky [26]). In addition, physicians’ estimates are modified by contextual effects such as
severity of symptoms and personal experience (Weber and Hilton [32]; Weber, Böckenholt,
Hilton, and Wallace [33]). Also, subjective probabilities are often poorly calibrated (e.g.,
Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, and Phillips [18]), that is, experimenters could find systematic
distortions between objective and subjective probabilities of real life events (but see
Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, and Kleinbölting [15]). In Zimmer’s work [37], however, students
appeared to be well calibrated when “objective probabilities” were plotted against the
median value of the possibility functions representing the meaning of verbal markers.
Beside systematic biases, some researchers questioned the relevancy of probability
as a normative framework for human handling of uncertainty. First, information about
uncertainty is conveyed through language and thus might be qualitative in essence, rather
than numerical. Hence, several works investigated peculiarities in the human processing of
linguistically conveyed uncertainty (e.g., [29,31]). Some of them used fuzzy set concepts
to parallel numerical and linguistic uncertainty (e.g., [21]). At first, some authors argued
that confidence about a single event (e.g., whether or not a given answer is currently
correct) cannot be represented by a probability because probabilities are designed to
describe uncertainty in the long run, not single events. In this line of thought, no statement
about confidences that are related to single events can violate probability theory [15].
The probabilistic framework is also weak for describing partial ignorance, that is, cases
where uncertainty about an event is poorly correlated with uncertainty about the opposite
event [8]. In probability theory, knowledge about A is expressed as p(A), which is directly
related to p(¬A):
p(A)= 1− p(¬A). (1)
Hence, probabilities hardly describe cases where subjects have little or no information
about A, so that A is fully possible while ¬A is also possible. In addition, if we ignore
p(A) and p(B) but we know that p(A ∨ B) = 1/2, and if A and B are independent,
the probabilistic framework requires that p(A) = p(B) = 1/4. In fact, this indifference
principle does not represent ignorance but rather the implicit assumption that A and B have
the same prior probability, which is also questionable (e.g., [23]). In order to represent
partial ignorance, all non-standard formal theories of uncertainty share a major property
that does not exist in standard probability theory: they represent uncertainty by means of
two measures (e.g., Dubois and Prade [8]; Kyburg [17]; Shafer [23]). The lower functions
exhibit “subadditivity”, that is, the fact that lower measures for complementary events
generally do not sum up to 1. To the contrary, the upper functions exhibit “superadditivity”,
that is, the fact that upper measures for complementary events generally sum above 1.
Interestingly, those properties can be matched with a psychological finding about human
judgment: Ayton [3] reports some studies of in which subadditivity held, and other
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studies in which superadditivity held. A natural explanation for these apparently discrepant
findings could be that humans process uncertainty by mean of two estimates, just like non-
standard approaches do. Since the ability to represent optimally partial ignorance is a very
desirable property for a biological cognitive system, it would not be surprising for human
uncertainty to fit better non-standard approaches than standard probability theory.
1.2. The main reason why possibility theory is a good candidate
The arguments against standard probability theory as the best normative framework
for human uncertainty do not necessarily discard other—non-standard—frameworks.2
In our view, the main argument that favors possibility theory over other non-standard
frameworks (and over standard probability theory) is bound to the fact that uncertainty
in human affairs often requires pure qualitative, ordinal handling. This is the reason why a
purely psychological theory (i.e., a descriptive but not normative theory) like the semantic
theory of evidence (Miyamoto et al. [19]) claims to work on ordinal support functions.
Another descriptive psychological theory, support theory (Tversky and Koehler [28]) also
embeds an ordinal extension. Interestingly, in a test of support theory, Ayton [3] found
that subadditivity of subjective probabilities could be explained if they were, in fact, not
additive.
From a psychological standpoint, both probability theory and Shafer’s mathematical
theory of evidence are plagued by the problem of ordinal uncertainty because these theories
are numeric in nature and do not hold for such things as verbally expressed uncertainty. To
the contrary, even if possibility theory exists in a numerical version, as a particular case
of Shafer’s theory of evidence, it also holds by itself for qualitative uncertainty, that is, in
cases where a numerical treatment of uncertainty is not appropriate (i.e., for non-additive
estimates). We shall now present possibility theory in its ordinal version, initially proposed
in Zadeh [36], and developed by Dubois and Prade (e.g., [8]).
2. Comparison of possibility and probability measures
Let X be an ill-known variable, say, the actual disease of a patient, and ΩX , the
set of all values ω that X can take on. For instance, ΩX could include all plausible
diseases, given the diagnostician’s medical knowledge, and given the data from an X-ray.ω
would be a particular diagnostic hypothesis. Zadeh [36] defined a “possibility distribution”
πx(ω) :Ω→[0,1] which expresses the extent to which it is possible that the actual value
of X be ω (e.g., X is the “Tom’s disease”, ω is “collapsed lung”, πx(ω) is the degree to
which it is possible that Tom has a “collapsed lung”). This definition holds true for the
range [0,1] taken as a set of ordinal (or numerical) values.
2 Indeed, standard probabilities are not necessarily completely inadequate (e.g., Cosmides and Tooby [6]).
Furthermore, probability theory and possibility theory are not completely independent. Zadeh [36] provided a
possibility/probability consistency principle, and there are rules for going from possibility to probability and
from probability to possibility (Dubois, Prade, and Sandri [10]).
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Now, if A is an event (i.e., a subset of Ω), Zadeh [36] defines the “possibility measure”
that A be correct as Π(A) = supω∈A πx(ω). In other words, Π(A) expresses the degree
to which A is consistent with all available information about the possible values of X.
If A is a diagnosis, the relationship may be interpreted as the level of possibility that
the patient has one of the variants of the diseases associated with A. First, we have
Π(Ω)= 1 and Π(∅)= 0. However, those relationships are not specific to a particular way
of modeling uncertainty (e.g., with probabilities, we also have p(Ω) = 1 and p(∅) = 0).
A characteristic property of possibility measures is their “max-decomposability”: the
possibility that a patient has at least one of two diseases A or B , is equal to the possibility
value of the “most possible” of the two:
Π(A∨B)=Max[Π(A),Π(B)]. (2)
In contrast, probabilities are additive:
p(A∨B)= p(A)+ p(B)−p(A∧B). (3)
Duality was introduced in possibility theory by Dubois and Prade [7]. The dual measure of
possibility is necessity (denoted N since [8])
N(A)= 1−Π(¬A). (4)
Also, in the general case we have
Π(A)N(A) (5)
which expresses the intuitive fact that something must be possible to some extent before it
can begin to be certain. Actually, possibility specifies relationships between Π and N in
a more precise manner: Π(A)= 1 if N(A) > 0 and N(A) = 0 if Π(A) < 1. This can be
rewritten in a single rule(
Π(A) < 1∧N(A) > 0)=⊥ (6)
that is, Π(A) should never be lower than 1 when N(A) > 0.
The dual relation of max-decomposability of possibility is “min-decomposability of
necessity”:
N(A∧B)=Min(N(A),N(B)). (7)
Another property that distinguishes possibility and probability measures is the relation
between the measures associated with complementary events A and ¬A. The probabilistic
relation is (1). As such, the relationship between p(A) and p(¬A) is fully determined.
By contrast, Π(A) and Π(¬A) are weakly dependent in real life situations like medical
diagnosis. For instance, given a particular piece of evidence, A can be fully possible and
¬A can be somewhat possible at the same time. This is why only an inequality stands:
Π(A)+Π(¬A) 1. (8)
(8) can be called the “superadditivity” of possibility measures. Of course, by duality,
N(A)+N(¬A) 1. (9)
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(9) can be called the “subadditivity” of necessity measures. The two previous relations
show that possibilistic measures express partial ignorance with more flexibility than do
probability measures.
Now we have the main relationships3 that are tested in the present paper. It is noteworthy
that all those relationships hold true for possibility theory in both its numerical and
qualitative versions whereas probability theory does not work with ordinal measures.
The general method used in the paper consists of building experiments in which
participants have to provide uncertainty measures about experimental stimuli that are
presented under various forms. Let us denote π and ν respectively the observed possibility
and the observed necessity that are measured on participants. The question is to test
whether the relationships involving π and ν fit the relationships that possibility theory
prescribes for Π and N .
Statistical techniques are applied to test whether relationships between participants’
uncertainty measures conform to predictions. Depending on the experiments, participants
were undergraduate students in psychology or experimented radiologists. In the latter case,
materials were composed with real medical cases.
3. Experiment 1: test of relations (5) and (6) using qualitative scales
Experiment 1 was intended to check whether subjects use linguistic markers in a
way compatible with possibility theory. It constitutes a first test of some relations with
qualitative scale and psychology students as raters.
3.1. Method
Participants. Forty first-year students at the University of Toulouse-II Le Mirail contrib-
uted on a voluntary basis.
Material. Four arguments (syllogisms), AR1 to AR4, were built (see Table 1) so that,
depending on the compatibility with students’ prior knowledge, subjective degree of belief
of the conclusion was varied. Those argument were built in such a way that the credibility
of the major premise decreased from AR1 to AR4. In particular, it was assumed that the
major premise in AR1 has no exception and is always true, whereas the one in AR4 is
always wrong. It was also supposed that AR2 is more plausible than AR3. Several studies
on reasoning under uncertainty with arguments in the form of modus ponens (e.g., George
[14]; Politzer and George [20]; Stevenson and Over [25]) showed a transmission from the
credibility attributed to the rule to the credibility of the conclusion. As a consequence, the
assumption was made that the credibility of conclusions would vary from AR1 down to
AR4.
3 We are aware that some of these relationships may appear redundant since the reader can easily draw one of
them from the others. However, it must be thought that human estimates are not always coherent and a person who
first accepts two statements as both true can spontaneously reject one of their consequences. And thus, testing
successfully (4) and (8) does NOT imply that (9) will hold, even if formally (9) can be derived from (4) and (8).
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Table 1
The four experimental arguments
(AR1)* (AR2) (AR3) (AR4)
Crocodiles are reptiles Southern persons have a tan Fishes are yellow Turtles are canids
Wally is a crocodile Marius is from Marseille Bubul is a fish Aglaé is a turtle
Wally is a reptile Marius has a tan Bubul is yellow Aglaé is a canid
* All the arguments are translated from French.
Procedure. Each participant had to provide a judgment on a 7-point scale (“totally certain
that it is true”; “almost certain that it is true”, “quite true”; “uncertain”; “quite false”;
“almost certain that it is false”; “totally certain that it is false”). Each participant also had to
provide two ratings about the conclusion. First, the participant had to rate on a 7-point scale
the degree to which the conclusion was possible, then the degree to which the conclusion
was certain. For possibility measures, the scale ranged from “It is totally possible that. . .”
to “it is not possible at all that. . .”. For necessity measures, the scale ranged from “It is
totally certain that. . .” to “it is not certain at all that. . .”. Those labels were then encoded
as ordinal numbers ranging from 1 (“totally”) to 0 (“not at all”).
Operational hypotheses. At a general level, the hypothesis was that participants’
estimates would conform to (5) and (6). Let us denote π(ARi ) and ν(ARi ) respectively the
estimates provided by participants for possibility and necessity measures associated with
the ith syllogism. In addition to (5) and (6), and because we expect syllogisms to induce
decreasing confidence from certainty in AR1 to total disbelief in AR4, we can make the
following predictions:
π(AR1)≈ ν(AR1)≈ 1,
π(AR2) > ν(AR2),
π(AR3) > ν(AR3),
π(AR4)≈ ν(AR4)≈ 0.
With regard to AR1 and AR4, relations come from the fact that ratings can not go above 1
or below 0 and then π and ν can be expected to converge near certainty and near disbelief:
the difference between them should fade and they should exhibit a significant correlation
(which actually would be an artifact of the limits). To the contrary, in AR2 and AR3,
ratings should be far from the limits and therefore π and ν should be uncorrelated while
the difference between them should become significant. Because data are fundamentally
ordinal, analyses were made by mean of non-parametric correlations (Spearman’ Rho) and
Wilcoxon tests [24].
3.2. Results
Overall, 26 participants out of 40 never violated (5). Twelve violated it on one of the
four syllogisms. One violated it on three syllogisms and one on all syllogisms. With regard
to (6) results are opposite: only 3 participants never violated it.
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AR1: The Spearman correlation between π(AR1) and ν(AR1) was positive and significant
(ρ(40) = 0.524;p = 0.001). The Wilcoxon test could not reveal a difference between the
levels reached by π(AR1) and ν(AR1)(Z(39) =−0.36; non-significant). More than half of the
responses for π(AR1) and ν(AR1) were equal to 1 (22 out of 40 for π and 29 out of 40 for
ν). Nevertheless, 17 participants out of 40 violated (6) and 9 participants violated (5).
AR2: The Spearman correlation between π(AR2) and ν(AR2) was not significant. The
Wilcoxon test showed that π(AR2) was generally greater that ν(AR2)(Z(39) = −0.425;
p < 0.001). Only 2 participants out of 40 violated (5) but 20 participants violated (6).
AR3: The Spearman correlation between π(AR3) and ν(AR3) was not significant. The
Wilcoxon test showed that π(AR1) was generally greater that ν(AR1) (Z(39) = −0.425;
p < 0.001). Only 2 participants out of 40 violated (5) but 20 participants violated (6).
AR4: The Spearman correlation between π(AR4) and ν(AR4) was positive and significant
(ρ(40) = 0.621; p < 0.001). The Wilcoxon test could not reveal a difference between the
levels reached by π(AR4) and ν(AR4) (Z(39) = −1.67; non-significant). More than half of
the responses for π(AR1) and ν(AR1) were equal to 1 (22 out of 40 for π and 29 out of 40
for ν). Only 4 participants out of 40 violated (5) but 17 participants violated (6).
3.3. Discussion
When considering the well-known randomness associated with human estimates, results
are clearly in agreement with (5). In addition they suggest that π and ν are not correlated
unless they both tend to one of the limits (0 or 1). This is in agreement with possibility
theory. However, it is not possible to defend that (6) holds strictly. Nevertheless, a simple
explanation can reasonably by proposed for this lack of fit. It is based on the notion of
strategic prudence. When considering a sample of human persons, many will strategically
try to avoid extreme opinions and extreme ratings. This kind of behavior has an important
value for social life but it makes difficult the direct testing of (6) because this relation
requires the systematic production of extreme values: at any moment, at least one of the
two measures must have an extreme value. Because of such “prudence bias”, it can be
expected that average judgments will be contained within an interval [ε0,1− ε1] (instead
of [0,1]), with ε0 and ε1 being not known a priori. On the whole, participants exhibited
an intuitive comprehension of the linguistic markers for possibility and necessity. This
comprehension was roughly conformed to possibility theory prescriptions.
4. Experiment 2: test of (4), (5), (6), (8), (9) using numerical scales
The first experiment made use of qualitative scales. Relations might be different if
participants were offered analogical scale providing numerical values. In addition, raters in
experiment 1 were students. One might argue that with experts who are trained to deal with
uncertainty, things would be different. Thus, the second experiment extended the initial test
by introducing numerical scales, it tested more relationships and raters were experimented
radiologists.
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4.1. MethodParticipants. Four radiologists volunteered. They had professional experiences ranging
from 8 to 17 years after the end of internship (mean experience: 12.0 years).
Material. Twenty-eight digitized images from 28 patients were shown on a PC computer
screen. Two were used for familiarisation with the task. The radiologists independently
reviewed the films. No clinical history was provided. All of the films were from patients
with an actual pathology and participants were told that no film was normal.
Procedure. For each case, the radiologists triggered the viewing of the films. They could
explore the picture as long as needed. Then they clicked on a button to start the question
answering, at which point the image was deleted from the screen, and the subject answered
from memory. The first question asked the subject to type two diagnoses (no more and no
less). Then came questions about the radiologist’s confidence judgments in the hypotheses
he or she had. Suppose the participant typed “Atelectasis” then “Pleural effusion”. To get
confidence judgments, the computer generated questions about those diagnoses:
For π(X): To what degree is it possible that the diagnosis Atelectasis is right?
For ν(X): To what degree is it certain that the diagnosis Atelectasis is right?
For π(¬X): To what degree is it possible that the diagnosis Atelectasis is wrong?
All of the participant’s diagnoses received confidence judgments, expressed using a
cursor that slid from “Not possible at all” to “Totally possible” for possibility judgments,
and from “Not certain at all” to “Totally certain” for necessity judgments. The cursor
returned a value on a scale ranging from 0 to 100. These values were used directly as
confidence judgments. Therefore, in all expected relationships, 1 must be replaced by 100.
Analysis. Differences were tested using standard t tests. Equalities were first tested
through Pearson correlations and t-tests of the mean difference, which had to be non-
significant. Indeed, finding a non-significant difference does not allow to assert that the
difference is small enough to be negligible, as is required to test experimentally an equality.
Thus, we also used a “Bayesian inference” procedure (Rouanet [22]). Such a procedure
is complementary to traditional frequentist inference and computes the guarantee γ a
researcher has when asserting the smallness (or largeness) of an effect. According to
Rouanet (1996), a standardized effect |δcal| < 0.4 can be deemed small. A reasonable
guarantee is γ = p(|δcal|< 0.4) .9 (rather than the complementary values of the familiar
α levels) because “assessing importance is a more demanding task than significance” [22,
p. 151].
4.2. Results
The hypothesis that was judged to be the most plausible is noted X.
With regard to duality (4), the predicted correlations were obtained. The expected
positive correlations between ν(X) and 100− π(¬X) were high and significant (r(103) =
0.71, p < 0.0005) as were the correlations between ν(¬X) and 100−π(X) (r(103) = 0.69,
p < 0.0005). As expected, we found a weak mean difference that was not significant
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(md = 2,01; t(103) = 1.49, p = 0.138). Furthermore, using Bayesian inference, γ =
p(|δcal| < 0.376) = 0.99 and, because γ > 0.90, not only was the difference non-
significant but equality could be positively assumed with a reasonable guarantee. The
second equality, ν(¬X) = 100 − π(X), however, was not as good: although the mean
difference was weak (md = 3.75), it was significant (t(103) = 3.24, p = 0.002).
Participants conformed well to (5): with a paired Student’s t-test, π(X) was significantly
greater than ν(X) (83.2 vs. 76.3 respectively; mean difference: 7.0; t(103) = 6.04; p <
0.0005).
Participants did not satisfy (6) at all: If these rules had been satisfied, we would have
found few if any cases such that π(A) < 100 while ν(A) > 0. But in 96 cases out of 104,
the radiologists indicated ν(A) > 0 and π(A) < 100 (z(103)= 5.47, p < 0.0001).
Superadditivity of the possibility functions (8) worked well, with the mean sum
π(X)+ π(¬X)≈ 108.9> 100 (t(103) = 5.87; p < 0.0005).
Subadditivity of necessity functions (9) also worked well, with the mean sum ν(X)+
ν(¬X)≈ 96.8< 100 (t(103)=−2.56; p = 0.006).
4.3. Discussion
Overall, results support some important properties of possibility theory, duality in
particular. Subadditivity of necessity measures and superadditivity of possibility measures
are important because they are not compatible with a standard probabilistic interpretation
of human confidence judgments. Yet it is still compatible with some other non-standard
additive models such as belief functions and plausibility functions [23]. Also, there was
clearly a problem with (6). In the following section, we argue that it is a methodological
artifact and we propose a technical solution.
5. Building a new measure of uncertainty: the Ψ -scale
Probability theory uses one measure of uncertainty whereas possibility theory uses two
measures. This raises a new question: How can we build an apparatus for comparing
human performance with both frameworks? Ideally, such an apparatus will enable raters
to provide their estimates in one measure so that extra-vagueness would not be added
to spontaneous confidence judgments. At the same time this measurement apparatus
must enable the experimenter to compute both possibility and necessity measures from
a participant’s rating. Moreover, possibility and necessity measures are compatible with
possibility theory only if something is fully possible before being somewhat certain. This
condition was not fully fulfilled in experiments 1 and 2. As mentioned earlier, it might
be due to considerations that are not relevant to formal aspects of theories, like the desire
to avoid extreme opinions. Hence, we can try to get uncertainty measures that would be
less subject to those biases. For this purpose, it is noteworthy that if a possibility measure
is relevant for testing a given hypothesis (i.e., Π(A) < 1), then asking for a necessity
measure is not relevant (i.e., it provides no new information since N(A) is necessarily
equal to 0). Reciprocally, if a necessity measure is appropriate (i.e., N(A) > 0), then asking
a possibility measure is not relevant (since Π(A) is necessarily equal to 1). So, is there a
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way to produce proper possibilistic measures from the participant’s estimates? We propose
the following solution: participants are given a choice between a possibility and a necessity
measure. They produce confidence judgments using only one of the two scales, and the
software forces the value for the other scale. Participants are informed that the two scales
are related, so they can choose a scale with full knowledge of the consequences on the
other. Now, how can we compare such measures with a subjective probability measure that
is single by nature? Didier Dubois (personal communication) proposed using a single scale
combining both possibility and necessity measures and ranging from “totally impossible”
to “totally certain”. Henceforth, we shall call “Ψ -scale” the scale where possibility and
necessity measures are averaged into a “Ψ -measure”,
Ψ (h)= 12
[
Π(h)+N(h)]. (10)
Reciprocally, after measuring a confidence degree with a single measure, as it is usually
done, one can reconstruct both Π and N from this measure:{
If Ψ (h) 12 then Π(h)= 2 ∗Ψ (h); N(h)= 0,
If Ψ (h) 12 then Π(h)= 1;N(h)= 2 ∗Ψ (h)− 1.
(11)
This apparatus has the advantage of enabling a comparison of the possibility and
probability frameworks because one can either directly use the Ψ -measure as a subjective
probability measure, or split the Ψ -measure into a possibility and a necessity measures.
Incidentally, the reader can easily check from (10) that, just like a probability, the Ψ -scale
is auto-dual:
Ψ (h)= 1−Ψ (¬h). (12)
In possibility theory, total uncertainty is the conjunction of Π(h)= 1 andN(h)= 0, that is,
“everything is possible and nothing is certain”. Therefore, with a Ψ -scale, total ignorance
is denotedΨ (h)= 1/2. The present article tested whether human processing of uncertainty
conforms to possibility theory, which would lead to the reinterpretation of “subjective
probabilities” as “subjective possibilities”, in line with Zadeh proposal [36]. If such an
interpretation is correct, we should be able to equate Ψ -measures with direct subjective
probabilities. The following experiment used the Ψ -scale apparatus.
6. Experiment 3: test of disjunction of confidence judgments
This experiment was designed (a) to test whetherΨ -scale measures can be used as direct
subjective probability measures; (b) to test some basic assumptions of possibility theory,
and particularly Max-decomposability of possibility measures (2) vs. the probabilistic
model of disjunction (3). The experiment enabled replication, using Ψ -measures, of a
successful result obtained in experiment 2, that is, duality (4). Auto-duality of Ψ -measures
(12) was also tested.
The experiment used a series of measures. First, a measure was taken using the Ψ -
scale (Fig. 1) and was compared to a direct measure of subjective probability (raters were
explicitly asked to provide a probability, Fig. 2).
208 E. Raufaste et al. / Artificial Intelligence 148 (2003) 197–218Fig. 1. The Ψ -scale measurement apparatus. The scale is composed of two dissociated sliders. The initial position
is as shown on the picture: everything is possible, nothing is certain.
Fig. 2. The direct probability measurement apparatus. The scale is composed of two dissociated sliders. The initial
position is as shown on the picture: everything is possible, nothing is certain.
The second part consisted in using the Ψ -measures to compute the models to be tested.
For probabilistic models, the probability measures were directly given by the Ψ -scale.
For possibilistic models, possibility and necessity measures were computed from the
Ψ -scale. Finally, values computed from the model were compared to directly measured
values.
Let us denote Ψ (.) the direct Ψ -measure; π(.) and ν(.) the measures of possibility and
necessity respectively derived from Ψ (.) using (11); Π(.) and N(.) are the possibilistic
models. As an example, suppose a participant provided Ψ (A); Ψ (B), Ψ (A ∨ B), where
A and B are two diagnostic hypotheses. Applying (11) to Ψ (A), Ψ (B), and Ψ (A ∨ B),
respectively, we get π(A), π(B), and π(A∨B). Now, applying (2), we get
Π(A∨B)=Max(π(A),π(B)).
Then, we can compare how Π(A ∨ B), the possibilistic model for disjunction, fits
π(A ∨ B), the observed value for disjunction. Ultimately, we can test which model of
disjunction fits data the best.
6.1. Method
Participants. The participants were four radiologists with professional experience
ranging from 6 to 17 years after the end of internship (mean experience: 10.5 years).
Material. Twenty-five digitized images from 25 patients were shown. One film was used
for familiarization with the task. In order to test the predictions of normative theories over a
wider range of uncertainty, we manipulated uncertainty: a short clinical history was given,
along with two diagnoses that had been chosen on the basis of their compatibility with
typical interpretations of the salient cues on the X-rays. The two diagnoses were said to
have been made by a first-year novice. We generated three conditions: both diagnoses
compatible with the X-ray (CC condition), one compatible diagnosis and one incompatible
diagnosis (CN condition), and both diagnoses not very compatible (NN condition). There
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were 8 films in each condition. The presentation order was randomly determined by the
computer. To control for order effects among the cases in the CN condition, four cases had
the compatible diagnosis presented first, and four cases had the incompatible diagnosis
presented first.
The radiologists being tested entered confidence judgments in the computer by means
of a custom-designed software tool we developed to implement the Ψ -scale. It consisted
of two cursors. The upper cursor was used for the possibility measure and the lower cursor,
for the necessity measure. For each rating, the radiologist used only one of the two cursors.
Depending on the final locations of the chosen cursor, the program returned a possibility
value and a necessity value, both ranging from 0 to 100. Before modification, the scale was
set to Π = 1 and N = 0 (i.e., “Totally possible” and “Not certain at all”).
The answer to the direct probability question was recorded via a single cursor ranging
from 0 (“no chance, the probability is null”) to 100 (“there is a 100% chance”). In-
itially, the cursor was set at the midpoint, which was labeled “50% or one chance out
of two”.
Procedure. The radiologists viewed the films independently. Every case was processed
as follows. (1) The diagnostician read a short clinical history and the two diagnoses
attributed to a first-year novice. He or she triggered the appearance of an image by clicking
on a button. When a decision was made, the radiologist clicked a button to start answering
questions. This removed the image from the screen and stopped the timer. A series of
questions was then presented to the participant. The first question asked the radiologist to
enter the proposed diagnoses. Up to four diagnoses could be entered on the same screen,
with associated confidence judgments. The radiologist was free to enter the diagnoses in
any order.
Let us call X the most plausible diagnosis (the one with the highest confidence
judgment), and Y the second most plausible. The program identified X and Y (Y , if at least
two diagnoses were entered) on the basis of the plausibility measures. The diagnostician
was then asked to provide a confidence judgment about the plausibility of X (and Y if there
was one) being wrong.
Hereafter, we shall call the novice’s first and second diagnoses A and B , respectively.
The radiologist was asked to make one confidence judgment for A, one for B , one for
the disjunction A ∨ B , and one for the conjunction A ∧ B . The final question asked the
participant to make a direct probability judgment about whether X was correct. As in
experiment 1, the program generated questions about the diagnoses. Given two diagnoses
“Atelectasis” and “pleural effusion”, here are some examples of the new questions:
For elementary Ψ -measures: To what degree does the following diagnosis “Atelectasis”
seems correct to you?
For disjunction: To what degree does at least one of the following diagnoses seem
correct to you?: 1. Atelectasis 2. Pleural effusion.
For conjunction: To what degree do both of the following diagnoses seem correct to
you?: 1. Atelectasis 2. pleural effusion.
For direct probability measures: What is the probability that the diagnosis “Atelectasis”
is correct?
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6.2. ResultsSubjective probabilities as subjective possibilities. As expected the correlation between
Ψ -measures and direct subjective probabilities was high and positive (r(95) = 0.61; p <
0.0005). Furthermore, as expected, there was no significant difference between subjective
probability measures and Ψ -measures (t(95) = 0.39), and Bayesian inference allows us
to claim that the mean difference may be neglected with a comfortable guarantee γ =
p(|δcal|< 0.366)= 0.999. Now, to use Ψ -measures as probabilistic measures, it is useful
to evaluate the error of the tool. The mean error was less than 1% (mean error = 0.71;
SD = 1.80), which is good. Therefore, we can expect the error when using Ψ -measures
as subjective probability measures to fall within the interval [−4.3%,+2.9%] in 95% of
the observations (m± 2σ , for observations ranging from 0 to 100). Consequently, it seems
legitimate to use Ψ -measures as subjective probabilities.
Disjunction. In 12 cases out of 96, the radiologists produced measures that were
incompatible with the probabilistic framework because the model led to predicted values
below 0 (1 case) or greater than 100 (11 cases). But these measures were still compatible
with the possibilistic model. Nevertheless, in order to reinforce the case against possibility
theory, these cases were excluded from the computation of the fit between the data
and the probabilistic model. The results showed that both the probabilistic model and
the possibilistic model fit the data. An unpredicted result was the fact that the Max-
decomposability model, which was required only for π -measures, also gave a good fit
with ν- and Ψ -measures (see Table 2).
Duality. Duality of π and ν measures as well as auto-duality of Ψ -measures were clearly
obtained. For one relation, (ν(¬X)= 100− π(X)), 93 pairs out of 96 were exactly equal,
which is remarkable. For the other relations, the correlations ranged from 0.51 to 0.79
(n= 96, all ps < 0.0005) and, as expected, the differences were weak and non-significant.
All but one of the Bayesian guarantees were over 0.90.
In summary. There appears to be a duality between possibility and necessity measures.
The direct measures of subjective probabilities were significantly correlated with both
the possibility and the necessity measures. After computing Ψ -measures from possibility
and necessity measures, the Ψ -measures appeared to be strongly correlated with the
direct subjective probabilities. The accuracy of the fit between the Ψ -measures and the
Table 2
Comparison of observed possibility disjunctions with both possibilistic and probabilistic predictions
Models of Pearson correlations Descriptive comparison Statistical inference
disjunction observed–predicted Obs. Pred. dobs sobs δcal t sig. γ *
Max (on π ) r(94) = 0.80 p < 0.0005 75.4 76.0 −0.6 25.4 −0.024 −0.24 ns 0.999
Max (on Ψ ) r(94) = 0.88 p < 0.0005 59.2 58.0 1.2 18.2 0.066 0.65 ns 0.999
Proba (on Ψ ) r(82) = 0.83 p < 0.0005 56.2 54.0 2.2 22.1 0.101 −0.53 ns 0.996
* Guarantee that the difference between the model and the data is negligible.
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direct subjective probabilities was better than 5%, allowing us to interpret Ψ -measures as
subjective probabilities.
Max-decomposability of Ψ -measures fit the data despite the fact that we only expected
this for possibility measures. Overall, the possibilistic model fitted the data well, actually
better than the probabilistic model which was not compatible with some of the data.
7. Experiment 4: test of conjunction of confidence judgments
In experiment 3, we did not distinguish between cases where elementary events were
independent from cases where they were dependent. Therefore, we could not formally test
conjunction, because the two conditions require different computations. Experiment 4 was
designed to replicate previous results and to extend the testing of combinatorial properties
to conjunction.
As in the previous experiment, let us denote Ψ (.) the direct confidence degree measured
using the Ψ -scale, π(.) and ν(.) the observed possibility and necessity measures derived
from Ψ (.), Π(.), N(.), the possibilistic models and p(.) the probabilistic models.
Disjunction models were computed in the same way as in the previous experiment,
because disjunction is not sensitive to the dependency of elementary events.
In the independent condition, the conjunction was computed using p(A∧B)= Ψ (A) ∗
Ψ (B) in the probabilistic model, and N(A ∧ B) = Min(ν(A), ν(B)) in the possibilistic
model (according to Eq. (7)).
In the dependent condition, the conjunction was computed using the relation
p(A∧B)= Ψ (A) ∗Ψ (B |A)= Ψ (B) ∗Ψ (A | B)
for the probabilistic model, and using
N(A∧B)=Min(ν(A), ν(B |A))=Min(ν(B), ν(A | B))
for the possibilistic model.
7.1. Method
Participants. The participants were four radiologists with professional experience
ranging from 6 to 17 years after the end of internship (mean experience: 10.5 years).
Material. The method was similar to that used in the previous experiment. In addition,
two conditions were generated: in the independent condition (12 X-rays), the diagnoses of
the novice were independent. X-rays were chosen so as to show two different sets of clues,
each one leading to a specific kind of diagnosis. In the dependent condition (12 X-rays),
the X-rays and proposed diagnoses were chosen in such way that the two diagnoses were
either mutually exclusive (6 X-rays) or mutually consistent (6 X-rays). In the mutually
exclusive condition, the diagnoses were chosen so that if one of them accounted for the
data, the other had no reason to be correct. In contrast, mutually consistent diagnoses were
chosen so that if one was correct, the other was also probably correct.
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Procedure. The procedure was the same as in experiment 3, but the duality and
direct subjective probability questions were replaced by conditional questions (A | B)
and (B |A). For instance, if A was atelectasis, and B , pleural effusion (two conflicting
diagnoses), Ψ (A | B) was asked by means of a question like “Assuming that the diagnosis
pleural effusion is correct, then to what extent does it seem plausible to you that the
diagnosis atelectasis is correct?”
7.2. Results
Disjunction. In 19 cases out of 96, the radiologists produced measures that were
incompatible with the probabilistic framework (although compatible with the possibilistic
one) because the probabilistic model led to predicted values below 0 (1 case) or greater
than 100 (18 cases). These cases were eliminated from the computation of the fit between
the data and the probabilistic model. Nevertheless, the results showed that the possibilistic
model fitted the data better than the probabilistic one because the difference between
the model and the data was non-significant with possibilities whereas it was significant
with probabilities. As in the previous experiment, we found an even better fit when Max-
decomposability was applied to the Ψ -values. Thus, with regard to disjunction, the results
of this experiment replicated the results of experiment 2 (see Table 3).
Conjunction. In the independent condition, the fit was better with the possibilistic
model than with the probabilistic one (see Table 4) because the difference between the
data and the latter model was significant. In addition, Bayesian inference allowed us
to claim negligibility of the difference between data and the possibilistic model, but
Table 3
Comparison of observed possibility disjunctions with both possibilistic and probabilistic predictions
Models of Pearson correlation Descriptive comparison Statistical inference
disjunction observed–predicted Obs. Pred. dobs sobs δcal t sig. γ *
Max (on Π) r(94) = 0.775 p < 0.0005 89.8 88.9 1.0 18.2 0.055 0.52 ns 0.999
Max (on Ψ ) r(94) = 0.835 p < 0.0005 77.5 74.3 3.2 17.5 0.183 1.80 ns 0.982
Proba (on Ψ ) R(75) = 0.749 p < 0.0005 73.4 65.6 7.8 22.4 0.348 3.04 0.003 ue**
* Guarantee that the difference between the model and the data is negligible.
**
“Undetermined effect”: negligibility cannot be claimed.
Table 4
Comparison of conjunction models with data (independence condition)
Models of Pearson correlation Descriptive comparison Statistical inference
conjunction observed–predicted Obs. Pred. dobs sobs δcal t sig. γ *
Min (on N ) r(46) = 0.856 p < 0.0005 27.6 24.0 3.6 20.0 0.182 1.30 ns 0.931
Min (on Ψ ) r(46) = 0.919 p < 0.0005 37.0 35.4 1.6 16.1 0.102 0.70 ns 0.977
Proba (on Ψ ) R(46) = 0.919 p < 0.0005 37.0 32.5 4.5 16.1 0.283 1.96 0.028 ue**
* Guarantee that the difference between the model and the data is negligible.
**
“Undetermined effect”: negligibility cannot be claimed.
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Table 5
Comparison of conjunction models with data (dependence condition treated with independence condition models)
Models of Pearson correlation Descriptive comparison Statistical inference
conjunction observed–predicted Obs. Pred. dobs sobs δcal t sig. γ *
Min (on N ) r(46) = 0.70 p < 0.0005 17.3 18.3 −1.0 25.9 −0.037 −0.26 ns 0.990
Min (on Ψ ) r(46) = 0.67 p < 0.0005 31.2 34.6 −3.4 28.5 −0.118 −0.82 ns 0.971
Proba (on Ψ ) r(34) = 0.90** p < 0.0005 33.9 25.4 8.5 16.8 0.503 3.02 0.005 ue***
* Guarantee that the difference between the model and the data is negligible.
** This correlation seems stronger than the others, but when the possibilistic model was computed on the
restricted subset of cases where the data did not lead to rejection of the probabilistic model, the correlation was
comparable (r(35)= 0.89; p < 0.0005).
***
“Undetermined effect”: negligibility cannot be claimed.
not between data and the probabilistic model. Surprisingly, the best fit appeared with
possibility measures (r(46)= 0.928; mean difference < 0.4%). This could be due to the
fact that in the part of the scale where most conjunction ratings were (below 50), possibility
measures are more relevant than necessity measures.
In the dependent condition, no model fit the data because the differences between the
data and both the possibilistic and the probabilistic models were highly significant. The
observed data were largely below the predicted values (the lowest mean difference was 20
and all p  0.001). Hence, both models should be rejected in the dependent condition.
Quite surprisingly, if we try to apply the models of the independent condition to the
dependent condition data, we find that these “simplified models” fit the data reasonably
well (see Table 5).
Thus, radiologists appeared to treat conjunction in the dependent condition as if
the elementary events were independent. In fact, such a claim would be overly strong
because spontaneous verbal reports showed that participants treated incompatible events as
completely exclusive and gave a zero value for the conjunction, even if the two elementary
confidence judgments were above zero. If we distinguish between cases where elementary
events tended to be mutually exclusive and cases where they were consistent, we find that
the correlations between the models and the data were good for consistent events (ranging
from r(23) = 0.74, p < 0.0005 one-tailed to r(23) = 0.87, p < 0.0005) whereas they were
low for mutually exclusive events (ranging from r(23) = 0.236, p = 0.053 one-tailed to
r(23) = 0.53, p = 0.004). If we apply the comparison of possibilistic vs. probabilistic
frameworks with the simplified models (processing dependent conjuncts as if they were
either independent or totally exclusive), the possibilistic model appears to be better because
there is a clearly significant difference between the probabilistic calculus and the data,
whereas the possibilistic calculus fits the data well.
7.3. Discussion
Results obtained in experiment 4 replicated and extended those found in experiment 3.
For disjunction, possibilistic models were better because the absolute values of the
data differed significantly from the probabilistic model and did not differ significantly
from the possibilistic model. The results for conjunction were more contrasted: in the
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Table 6
Comparison of observed conjunctions with both possibilistic and probabilistic predictions, based on the results
of experiment 2
Models of Pearson correlation Descriptive comparison Statistical inference
conjunction observed–predicted Obs. Pred. dobs sobs δcal t sig. γ *
Min (on N ) r(94) = 0.786 p < 0.0005 22.5 21.1 1.3 23.2 0.058 0.57 ns 0.999
Min (on Ψ ) r(94) = 0.809 p < 0.0005 34.1 35.0 −0.8 23.1 −0.037 −0.37 ns 0.999
Proba (on Ψ ) r(76) = 0.921** p < 0.0005 34.1 26.0 7.8 15.2 0.511 4.49 <0.001 ue***
* Guarantee that the difference between the model and the data is negligible.
** This correlation is stronger than the others, but when the possibilistic model was computed on the restricted
subset of cases where the data did not lead to rejection of the probabilistic model, the correlation was comparable
(r(76) = 0.921; p < 0.0005).
***
“Undetermined effect”: negligibility cannot be claimed.
independent condition, the possibilistic outperformed the probabilistic one, but in the
dependent condition, neither was satisfactory. Nevertheless, from these results, we can
propose a new hypothesis about the combinatorial algorithm humans use for conjunctions:
for independent and consistent events, a min-rule is applied. For mutually exclusive events,
participants either attribute a zero value or use the min-rule. We call this algorithm
“satisficing conjunction”. It would be interesting to go back to the results of experiment 3
and test whether such a result could also be found. In experiment 3, we did not have the data
for distinguishing dependent and independent conditions (i.e., Ψ (A | B) and Ψ (B | A)),
so conjunction could not be tested formally. However, we can test whether satisficing
conjunction fits the experiment 2 data.
As Table 6 shows, both the probabilistic and possibilistic models of satisficing
conjunction fit the data of experiment 2, but as in experiment 3, the possibilistic model
was better because only the difference between the data and the probabilistic model was
significant. If we test the probabilistic model without the cases that led the predicted
disjunction to inconsistent values, the difference is even more striking (mean difference =
5.5, t(83) = 4.33, p < 0.001, two-tailed).
8. Summary and general discussion
In four experiments, we tested whether possibility theory describes intraindividual
human judgments of uncertainty, and particularly whether it describes human judgments
better than probability theory does. This article does not address the question of the
combinatorial rules an experimenter should use when combining judgments from different
raters. Nor does it address the question of calibration of confidence judgments, that is,
whether subjective probabilities fit objective probabilities measured in the real world. None
of the participants was instructed in possibility theory. Most of them had received a formal
training in probabilities at some moment. Therefore, if their reasoning and judgments were
biased by theoretical knowledge, it should have favor probability theory.
Unlike most experiments in psychology, participants of experiments 1 and 2 could rate
uncertainty by means of two direct measures, a “subjective possibility” and a “subjective
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necessity”. In such case, we could observe that the possibility measure was generally lower
than the necessity measure. More interesting, those values respected a duality relationship,
Π(A) = 1 − N(¬A), which is compatible with possibility theory, but which cannot be
predicted from probability theory. In addition, possibilities were generally superadditive
(Π(A) + Π(¬A) > 1) and necessities were generally subadditive (N(A) + N(¬A) <
1). This finding is predicted by possibility theory but is not compatible with standard
probability theory. Nevertheless, in many cases, Π(A) and N(A) were both greater than
zero, with Π(A) < 1. This is not compatible with possibility theory. Now, it can be
remarked that for any rating, only one measure of uncertainty is sufficient in possibility
theory: if N(A) > 1 then Π(A) must be 1. Therefore in such a case, Π is not relevant.
Reciprocally, if Π(A) < 1 then N(A) is necessarily equal to zero. Therefore N(A) is not
relevant in this case. Based on the idea that asking two measures when one is sufficient
might bias behaviors, we built a new apparatus called Ψ -scale. This apparatus enables
the rater to choose the single measure (possibility or necessity) that appears relevant,
and to give an answer on the corresponding cursor. The non-relevant measure (N or
Π ) is given its default value (0 for N and 1 for Π ). The Ψ -measure is computed by
averaging the possibility and necessity given by the Ψ -scale. A first important result is
that whatever the apparatus used (a “Ψ -measure” or a regular “subjective probability”
measure—as usual in psychology), those ratings were approximately equal. The second
important result is that the finding about duality was replicated in experiments 3 and 4,
which used Ψ -scale: the relationship Π(A) = 1 − N(¬A) was well verified in all four
experiments, which is not a trivial prediction. The third important result is that possibilistic
models of disjunction fitted the data better than the probabilistic model. In other words, a
characteristic axiom of possibility theory (max-decomposability of possibilities) appears to
fit human judgment. The forth important result is that the possibilistic model worked well
for conjunction, but only when conjuncts were independent. In this case it worked better
than the probabilistic (additive) model. When conjuncts were dependent, neither models
worked. However, a qualitative heuristic that we called “satisficing conjunction” seemed
to be used by participants: for mutually exclusive events, participants either attributed a
zero value or used the min-rule. For all other events, they applied a min rule.
A question that we left aside is the randomness inherent to human judgments (e.g., [30]).
This means that when possibility theory expresses a rule as duality (4), a human individual
who would follow this rule would actually be better described by a rule like
N(A)= 1−Π(¬A)+ ε (13)
where ε is a random noise. It must be clear to the reader that even if a possibilistic
combination rule fits the data of our human raters, this is after an averaging procedure
that makes this noise tending to zero.4
Another question that might be raised is about the status of linguistic markers that we
used: different people might interpret these terms differently. However we do not think
it was really a problem because our results show that, on average, the interpretation that
4 When averaging judgments from many subjects, the type of uncertainty handled, epistemic or aleatory about
exchangeable events, was empirically found to play a role on calibration [30], but we do not address the question
of calibration here.
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participants made of “possible” and “certain” was roughly compatible with the formal
interpretations of those terms. Otherwise it would be hard to explain why duality works
very well since it is not at all an intuitive relationship.
All together, those results provide a picture where human handling of uncertainty is
made through satisficing algorithms that are qualitative in their essence, and therefore are
more compatible with possibility theory than with probability theory. This is not to say that
probability theory should be totally abandoned. Some processes in the human cognitive
system are extremely well modeled with a Bayesian approach, particularly some automatic
and unconscious processes (e.g., [2]). Nevertheless, applying numerical inference is very
demanding at the conscious level and it is very unlikely that a human spontaneously
uses such algorithms in daily life situations. To the contrary, possibility theory uses only
Min, Max, and order-reversing operations. Those operations are not demanding for the
conscious cognitive system and can be used in daily life situations. In addition, the
human cognitive system evolved in social-life conditions where an efficient processing
of linguistic uncertainty could make a difference (e.g., group hunting). Possibility theory
is particularly well designed for handling linguistic uncertainty since it is able to work in
a pure qualitative way. For the moment, however, the study reported here is only a first
step toward providing a solid ground for its application. Judgments are one thing, actual
decisions another. This is why, for example, experiments in economics are usually about
choice. Under the related—but different—framework of fuzzy probability models, there
have been attempts to go beyond (e.g., [38]). We choose to start with possibility theory but
ultimately, we need to go beyond and test how possibilistic uncertainty combines with
utilities. It will now be possible to further investigate this question in the possibilistic
framework because the bases for a possibilistic, qualitative, decision theory were recently
developed [9].
Finally, beside principle arguments, the experimental results brought in this paper
support that Zadeh [36] was right when he had the intuition that, in humans, subjective
probabilities were actually subjective possibilities. Indeed, those findings are important
for cognitive modelers. Because humans are quite good at handling very complex and ill-
defined situations, they should also be of interest for other artificial intelligence researchers.
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